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2017: a year of disruption
Brexit, and the election of Emmanuel Macron, have galvanised the politi-
cal environments in Britain and France, respectively. Each development 
is, in its own way, highly disruptive of the status quo. If the mantra of 
disruption is ‘to move fast and break things’ (BBC Radio Four 2017), then 
the election of Macron to the French presidency and the wholesale suc-
cess of his political movement La République en Marche (LREM) in the 
French National Assembly fits the bill entirely. Macron and his party sped 
to power in little over 12 months and the French political landscape is, for 
now, littered with the debris of the political parties that he – and LREM – 
outwitted. In the business world, disruptive change involves stealing 
a march on one’s incumbents whose customers initially deem the new 
product to be inferior (Christensen et al. 2015). Substitute Macron for 
‘product’ and voters for ‘customers’, and here, too, the analogy is not so 
far- fetched (if unpleasant).
In the case of Brexit, the process can hardly be described as ‘fast’ 
but as time goes on, finding evidence that Brexit will not be inferior to EU 
membership is becoming harder and harder. Moreover, the UK’s with-
drawal from the EU is by definition a matter of ‘breaking things’, and 
the Franco- British relationship will certainly not be left undisturbed by 
the separation. At the same time, Brexit in fact fits perfectly into a cross- 
Channel friendship that for centuries has been marked by competition, 
collaboration, rivalry and change. No one should have been surprised 
that the UK’s shock decision by referendum to withdraw from the EU 
was greeted in France in part as an opportunity for French competitive 
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advantage. ‘Let the expatriates return!’, exclaimed French Prime Minister 
Édouard Philippe when presenting his government’s legislative pro-
gramme to the National Assembly (Philippe 2017). The French leader 
was making a general point about France’s future, but on the specifics of 
Brexit, such overtures have been just as common as expressions of regret. 
Given that ‘Year One’ of Brexit (from the referendum of 23 June 2016 to 
the UK general election of 8 June 2017) coincided with the French elec-
toral marathon – culminating in the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions in May and June 2017 respectively – it was particularly likely that 
Brexit would serve as electoral bait across the French political spectrum.
Brexit and the EU in the 2017 French elections
According to Édouard Philippe, the results of those elections can be taken 
as evidence that the French remain firmly attached to the EU and the 
euro, since they voted for a candidate – Emmanuel Macron – who openly 
embraced France’s European identity (Philippe 2017). ‘Frexit’ was cer-
tainly averted in the 2017 elections, despite being on the electoral ticket. 
One candidate, François Asselineau, had openly campaigned for Frexit 
but scored less than 1 per cent (0.92 per cent) of the votes in the first 
round of the presidential elections. Two other presidential candidates – 
Marine Le Pen and Jean- Luc Mélenchon  – fought highly Eurosceptic 
campaigns and achieved significant scores: in the first round the two can-
didates between them won just over 40 per cent of the votes combined 
(a total of over 14 million votes); and in the second round, Le Pen broke 
through the barrier of 10 million votes with a score of 33.9 per cent of the 
total (against Macron’s 66.1 per cent).
The entire thrust of Mélenchon’s campaign was to rail against the 
idea of a ‘submissive’ France. Applied to the question of Europe, this trans-
lated into a Plan A: to radically reform the EU treaties along with other 
Member States wishing to free themselves (as Mélenchon saw it) from, 
in particular, the rigours of eurozone governance. If Plan A failed, then 
Plan B was for France to unilaterally ‘leave’ the EU’s treaty framework 
(‘the EU: change it or leave it’). In the case of Marine Le Pen, the hor-
rors of the EU, as she portrayed them, were both central to her platform 
and a factor in her loss of the second- round presidential vote to Macron. 
Her number one proposal (out of 144) was to ‘recover France’s national 
sovereignty in a Europe of independent nations at the service of its 
peoples’ (Le Pen 2017), much as proponents of Brexit aim to ‘take 
back control’. She would negotiate this recovery of France’s ‘monetary, 
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legislative, territorial and economic sovereignties’ (Le Pen 2017) with her 
EU counterparts, and put the result to the French people in a referendum. 
For Le Pen, Brexit was inspirational, representing, in her eyes, nothing 
less than the liberation of the British people. Unfortunately for Le Pen, 
she performed badly when debating these issues on live TV, especially in 
the head- to- head debate with Macron between the first and second rounds 
of the presidential elections. Apparently unsure of her technical ground, 
her visceral emotions were laid bare for anyone who chose to see.
Sixty years of French engagement with the EU: 
at what cost?
Nevertheless, were the French to hold an ‘in– out’ referendum of its 
own on the subject of its EU membership, we would be unwise to pre-
dict the outcome. ‘Frexit’ was evidently no longer unthinkable by the 
time of the 2017 elections in France. Previous referendums in France 
on EU affairs have seen either narrow victories for further integration 
(as with Maastricht in 1993) or rejections (the Constitutional Treaty in 
2005), and French public support for EU membership remains shaky 
(Eurobarometer, 2017). Generations of French politicians since 1945 
have proclaimed their commitment to European integration in the form 
of a promise ‘to make Europe without unmaking France’ (see Bossuat 
2006; Drake & Reynolds 2017, 111), but France’s relations with the EU 
are problematic for domestic French politics, and have been for some 
time. In this respect, France and the UK are not so dissimilar in their 
quandary over what it means to be an EU Member State.
In 2011, the Economist’s Intelligence Unit downgraded France 
from a ‘full’ to a ‘flawed’ democracy on the specific grounds that its 
response to the eurozone crisis  – agreeing to more stringent oversight 
of national finances by Brussels – was undermining national democracy 
(Drake & Reynolds 2017, 113; Economist Intelligence Unit 2011). By the 
time of the 2012 presidential elections, the extent to which France was 
integrated into the EU was made more explicit by the leading presiden-
tial candidates than was typically the case; they could hardly do other-
wise in the context of the EU’s ongoing crises (financial and migratory, to 
name but two). That election, it has been argued, was an unprecedent-
edly ‘Europeanised contest’ whereby candidates joined the dots between 
national political competition (the presidential election) and EU- level 
policy orientation (Dehousse & Tacea 2012, 16). They did so overwhelm-
ingly to oppose the EU in some shape or form. The appeal of the two 
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leading Eurosceptic candidates of 2017 seen above – Mélenchon and Le 
Pen – was certainly established in this 2012 contest (between them they 
won almost 30 per cent of the votes in the first round). But front runners 
François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy were also critical of the EU’s han-
dling of the crises, and raised expectations that they would be the presi-
dent to improve EU affairs.
Constitutionally speaking, French presidents do have considerable 
leeway over European policymaking. Institutionally, they also have far 
more of a free hand than, say, the UK prime minister has: as Rozenberg 
(2016) has demonstrated, they are simply not held to account by their 
parties in Parliament in the same way. (We have seen how unwelcoming 
UK Prime Minister Theresa May has become to her parliamentary oppos-
ition on the matter of Brexit.) But to bring their party to power in the 
first place, French presidential candidates have to clear the hurdle of the 
two- round voting system of the presidential election. They have to ‘catch 
all’ in their electoral camp, Europhiles and Eurosceptics alike, by means 
of a ‘synthetic vision of Europe’ (Rozenberg 2016). This is a vision that 
papers over the cracks in their own parties and in the camp that delivered 
50+ per cent of the national vote, and stores up problems for the next 
elections. President Macron, as we saw above, came to power by creating 
a new political camp entirely. In so doing, he neatly side- stepped the pre-
vious ‘laws of nature’, and created an opportunity (however ephemeral) 
for French- led disruption on the EU stage.
Towards a ‘political Europe’?
It would seem from President Macron himself that the plan is to secure 
a ‘political Europe’. This is anything but original. For Rozenberg 
(2016, 2), ‘[t] he solution of a ‘political Europe’ is so regularly put 
forward that the idea has become polymorphous and even meaning-
less’. It certainly is a mainstay of French discourse on the EU, and it 
does arguably have some shape, at least conceptually. In Macron’s 
own words, a political Europe is a ‘voluntary and realistic association 
of states’ that have agreed upon ‘useful policies’ on matters such as 
the freedom of movement of goods and people, and especially young 
people, security, monetary and fiscal affairs, and culture (Macron 
2017). Macron differs little from his predecessors here in rationalis-
ing European integration as a matter for national states and govern-
ments (over and above free markets, and in theory favouring the long 
term and the strategic); as a project defined by fundamental values 
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(freedom, peace, progress); and as an expression of Europe’s poten-
tial as a global actor.
This is a vision that is airily dismissive of the EU’s actual nature 
as an intensely rules- based system of governance and, true to French 
form, Macron mocks the EU for its ‘tyranny of agendas and calendars’, 
likening the EU to neighbours in crisis- management mode, no longer 
trusting each other to run their communal assets and instead devis-
ing ever more rules to govern their interactions (Macron 2017). He 
attributes Euroscepticism in general, and Brexit in particular, to such 
distractions, as he sees them. He, in contrast, is impatient to get back 
to basics. By the end of 2017, says Macron, he will initiate ‘democratic 
conventions’ all across Europe to get the continent back onto this polit-
ical footing – a Europe that unites people. Member States can sign up 
or not, as they wish, he breezily announces. This, he claims, is a job 
for a new generation of political leaders, and perhaps here he has a 
point. Brexit, we should note in contrast, is being handled in the UK 
by an existing generation of leaders, many of whom appear unable or 
unwilling to escape the shadow of the past when it comes to the UK’s 
relations with the EU, and many of whom are seeking, if anything, to 
go backwards not forwards. With reference to both the EU– UK Brexit 
negotiations and Macron’s plans for a political Europe, Kuper’s (2017) 
argument against relying on rhetoric rather than a gritty engagement 
with the rules seems timely.
In the case of France there is some sense of more concrete 
priorities, and Brexit is towards the bottom of the list. It features as one 
of three EU- level negotiations that Prime Minister Édouard Philippe 
has identified as ‘crucial’, the others being the ‘redefinition of our pro-
ject as 27 with Germany and those of our partners who want to move 
ahead’; and the EU’s financial perspectives for beyond 2020 (Philippe 
2017). Above and beyond this triad of talks come two broader priori-
ties for France. The first is to ‘reconcile’ the French with the EU; the 
second is to build a ‘Europe that protects’ (via improved eurozone gov-
ernance; progress on EU defence policy and ‘social convergence’, and 
the development of a commercial policy based on reciprocity). These 
two ideas – restoring public confidence in the EU and in French lead-
ers’ ability to lead it, and re- orientating EU policy – are not remotely 
new, and flow from the ‘political Europe’ goal outlined above. As 
such, Macron’s best hope for results lies in French engagement on 
the ground. By way of example, the Franco- German Council in July 
2017 ended with an announcement of plans for a joint (‘European’) 
fighter jet. Whilst this signalled shared intentions to bolster the EU’s 
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autonomous defence capacity, the initiative for now raises far more 
questions than answers (Le Monde 2017).
Negotiating change …
Will France will be any more successful at re- engaging with the EU 
under Macron’s leadership than the UK will be at disengaging via Brexit? 
To succeed in either case implies productive negotiations with the other 
EU Member States and with the EU’s own institutions. Productive nego-
tiations, in turn, require the primary parties (in the case of Brexit, the 
EU Commission and the UK government) to be both properly constituted 
and fully functional (see Crump 2006). Year One of Brexit has already 
provided much food for thought in these regards and could be instruc-
tive by comparison for the French case.
By properly constituted we mean they must have clearly defined 
roles and cohesive and predictable support from supporting parties 
(such as junior partners in a government coalition). Taking the example 
of Brexit once more, the parties to the negotiations and their roles are 
highly structured on the EU side by dint of Treaty provision and the nego-
tiations guidelines and directives that have flowed from them (European 
Commission 2017c, European Council 2017a). On the UK side, the cohe-
sion and predictability of the primary party – the UK government – has 
been weakened since the UK general election of 8 June 2017, in which 
the Conservative government lost its majority in the House of Commons.
Second, to be functional means at the very least to be able to own 
the problem or the opportunity, to identify it as such; to take decisions; 
and to communicate those decisions as required (Crump 2006, 2). The 
EU party to the Brexit negotiations is for now fully functional: agreed 
on what Brexit means for the EU, agreed on how they want to talk 
about it with the UK government, in what sequence and by which 
deadlines. To date, they have communicated their interests coher-
ently, and speak with one voice. The solidarity of the EU27 may well 
fray when it comes to decision- making time, but they have entered 
the talks in good shape. In contrast, the UK party is dysfunctional. 
Rhetorically, the government has defined Brexit as an unrivalled and 
unprecedented opportunity for the UK, but this has yet to be translated 
into a negotiations script and is contested, even within the govern-
ment. In term of its decision- making capacity, the UK government has 
explicitly bound itself by the ‘will of the British people’ as expressed in 
outcome of the 23 June 2016 referendum. Since that referendum, the 
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courts and Parliament have predictably entered the decision- making 
arena since even the ‘will of the people’ must be implemented via due 
democratic process. Owning and communicating these facts – that the 
UK is a weak and dysfunctional negotiations party at a Brexit negotia-
tions table where the power is stacked against it – is understandably 
challenging.
… Or change through disruption?
For France and in contrast, negotiating its way back in to a position 
of power and influence within the EU27 should be far less fraught. 
France is well constituted as a negotiating partner following Macron 
and LREM’s victories at the 2017 elections. Moreover, it is func-
tional:  Macron ‘owned’ Europe from the night of his election victory 
on Sunday 7 May onwards, by appropriating symbols such as the EU 
anthem and the EU flag; Macron and his government have identi-
fied the EU as an opportunity; and to communicate all this, France’s 
current leaders are deploying a familiar rhetoric of ‘political Europe’ 
with the intention of disarming the Euroscepticism that has taken root 
in French political parties and public opinion alike. On the other side of 
the table are individual Member States and the EU institutions. There is 
no joint bloc to face France down, nor are France’s partners brandishing a 
ticking clock. The complex and heightened emotions that characterise the 
Brexit negotiations are less of an issue in France’s relations with the EU.
But there are time pressures on Macron and his government to 
deliver on their electoral promises (and not only on EU affairs). The 
presidency is ‘fast’ – a short five years (Cole 2012); expectations are high 
and the political climate is troubled. The very nature of Macron’s dis-
ruption of the status quo creates conditions in the political environment 
that threaten France’s ability to negotiate change at the EU level. We saw 
above that he is supported politically by a new camp that is untried and 
untested, and this potentially weakens the constitution – the coherence – 
of France as a negotiating partner. Indeed, the first weeks of the new 
government witnessed numerous ministerial resignations and reshuffles. 
Then there are threats to the functionality of France as an EU partner, 
and would- be leading partner at that. In particular, the risk of domes-
tic distractions is high, given the controversial agenda of socioeconomic 
change and the several false starts already made in this regard, and this 
will drain attention and decision- making resources (including political 
capital) away from the French executive.
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Conclusions
We have seen above that in the case of both France and the UK, 2017 
will have been a year of some reckoning. In particular and for both 
countries, EU membership came to dominate the political agenda and 
capture people’s emotions. In neither case was the status quo deemed 
sustainable. Accordingly, and on either side of the Channel, political 
leaders are engaged in challenging conversations with their domes-
tic and EU constituencies. The end game is change, and the method 
is disruption. Strictly speaking, disruption is not negotiated change. 
It is a method of challenging the status quo that relies on creativity, 
speed and luck. Its intent is positive in the sense of growth:  of 
markets, market share and consumer choice. But ‘moving fast and 
breaking things’ is a high- risk strategy in the business world, and in 
the political environment may well come at very high cost. Brexit 
and the Macron effect have broken their respective moulds, and we 
await the outcomes with much interest.
 
